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I. Introduction 
A cornerstone of central bank policy making is that the way to 
stimulate the economy is to lower interest rates and thereby increase 
the supply of narrow money. Since Lucas's (1972) seminal article 
economists have come to agree that only surprise changes in 
monetary policy are likely to have these effects. But, this view about 
how monetary policy affects economic activity is so prevalent that 
many monetary economists assess the success of a model of money 
according to its ability to produce lower short term nominal interest 
rates, higher narrow monetary aggregates, and higher prices in 
response to a expansionary monetary policy shock. 
In the empirical VAR literature on money these assumptions, which 
we refer to as the liquidity efect hypothesis, are the starting point for 
identlfjdng a shock to monetary policy.' If results from an iden- 
tification scheme are inconsistent with one of these maintained 
assumptions, this is thought to be a shortcoming of the empirical 
specification. For instance if an identified expansionary monetary 
policy shock produces a fall in the price level it is referred to a s  a 
price puzzle and other variables such a s  commodity prices are 
included in the VAR to resolve it. 
This prevailing wisdom about t.he workings of monetary policy has 
also had a profound influence on monetary theory. For instance, the 
finding by Greenwood and Huffman (1987) that calibrated versions of 
real business cycle models with money have the property that 
unexpected increases in the growth rate of money increase nominal 
interest rates, and inflation and lower output and employment, is 
perceived to be shortcoming of this class of model. Subsequent work 
by Lucas(1990) and Fuerst(1992) was specifically motivated by a 
desire to overturn this counterfactual implication of flexible price 
models of money. 
The gap between the predictions of theory and prevailing wisdom is 
not limited to flexible price models of money. In Rotemberg's (1996) 
costly price adjustment model with monopolisllcally competitive 
intermediate goods producers. Interest rates and output both rise in 
response to a surprise increase in the growth rate of money. 
Christiano. Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) provide cvidence that this 
' See Bernanke and Mlhov (1 998). Chrlstlano. Elchenbaum, and Evans 
(1996). and Leeper. Slms. and Zha (1996) for some recent examples. 
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is a robust prediction of costly price adjustment models and conclude 
that flexible price liquidity effect models are more consistent with the 
liquidity effect hypothesis. 
The confidence in the liquidity effect hypothesis is so strong that it 
now defines the data facts used to assess empirical models of money. 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), for instance, assess their 
model's performance on the basis of the distance of model predicted 
impulse responses to monetary policy shocks from data impulse 
responses to monetary policy. The data impulse response functions 
come from an identified structural VAR that has been selected in the 
first place because it is consistent with the liquidity effect hypothesis. 
Even though considerable efforts have been devoted to formulating 
theoretical models of money that are consistent with the prevailing 
wisdom, success has been elusive. It is surprisingly difficult to 
formulate either costly price adjustment or flexible price models that 
produce large persistent liquidity effects without appealing to ad hoc 
propagation mechanisms such as quadratic adjustment costs (see e.g. 
Basu and Kimball(2003) or Christiano (1991)) and/or assuming labor 
supply elasticities that are implausibly large (see e.g. Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans(1997)). Indeed, theory suggests that the 
liquidity effect hypothesis may not be a particularly robust phenom- 
enon. Producing model impulse responses that are consistent with 
the liquidity effect hypothesis requires specific configurations of model 
parameters including the monetary policy feedback rule. These 
parameters can vary across time and countries. Moreover, producing 
a persistent liquidity effect depends on details of the economy that we 
don't have much information about. 
The goal of this paper is to submit this cornerstone of modem 
monetary economics to more careful scrutiny and evaluate it on an 
equal footing with leading alternatives that are implied by theory. We 
use a monte-carlo procedure to empirically evaluate three alternative 
hypotheses about the workings of monetary policy. The first 
hypothesis, which we will refer to as the inflation tax hypothesis, is 
consistent with flexible price cash-in-advance models of money such 
as  Lucas and Stokey (1987), Greenwood and Huffman (1987). Cooley 
and Hansen (1989). and Sargent (1987). In all of these models a 
persistent innovation in the growth rate of money raises the nominal 
interest rate, increases inflation and lowers output. The second 
hypothesis, is the liquidity e3ect hypothesis - a surprise loosening of 
monetary policy lowers short term interest rates, increases narrow 
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monetary aggregates, raises output and raises the price level. The 
liquidity effect hypothesis is consistent with the implications of the 
flexible price models described in Christian0 (1991) and Fuerst (1992). 
The third hypothesis we will consider is that an  innovation in the 
growth rate of money acts to raise nominal interest rates, output and 
prices. These responses are produced by Rotemberg's (1996) sticky 
price model (see also Ireland (1997) and Aiyagari and Braun (1998)). 
We will refer to these joint implications a s  the costly prIce adjustment 
hypothesis. It is important to emphasize that these hypotheses reflect 
economic mechanisms which may all be operating simultaneously in 
the same model. What we are interested in understanding is which 
effects are largest and thus determine the responses we see in actual 
data. 
We evaluate each of these hypotheses by first generating monte 
carlo realizations that are consistent with a particular hypothesis 
using a procedure proposed by Uhlig (2001).2 This procedure achieves 
identification by imposing sign restrictions directly on the impulse 
responses of reduced form Vector Autoregressions WAR'S). We impose 
restrictions from each of the three maintained hypotheses. We then 
evaluate the plausibility of each hypothesis using two metrics: A 
classical approach based on the likelihood function which conditions 
on the estimated coefficients of a reduced form VAR as is common in 
the structural VAR literature. We also conduct simulations that allow 
for parameter uncertainty in the coefficients of the reduced form VAR. 
This allows us  to compute posterior probabilities for each maintained 
hypothesis under alternative sets of priors. 
We find substantial empirical evidence against the liquidity effect 
hypothesis in data from the U.S. and Japan. For the U.S. the 
plausibility of the liquidity hypothesis is very sensitive to the choice of 
variables. If we use variables other than the ones that are known to 
support the liquidity effect hypothesis from the previous literature, 
this hypothesis is rejected. We explore the reason for these rejections 
and find that it lies in the output response. U.S. data is more 
consistent with the predictions of the costly price adjustment model 
which implies that the short run response of output to a higher 
Federal Funds rate is positive. In Japan we find that it is very also 
very difficult to find specifications that are consistent with the 
2 ~ e  follow Uhllg(2004) here. But see also Faust (1998) and Canova 
(2002) for related approaches. 
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liquidity effect hypothesis. The reason for the rejections in Japan is 
the response of prices. Removing the sign restriction on prices 
produces a large and persistent price puzzle. Korean data provides 
the most evidence in favor of the liquidity effect hypothesis. This 
hypothesis performs well in the period before the Asian crisis and  
also sample periods that include the crisis. 
The remainder of the paper is organized a s  follows. Section I1 
describes the theoretical motivation for the three hypotheses in more 
detail. Section I11 describes the details of our identification and 
evaluation procedures. Section IV contains the results and section V 
concludes. 
11. Theoretical Motivation 
This section motivates the choice of our three hypotheses regarding 
the effects of a n  innovation in monetary policy. We start by describing 
the inflation tax hypothesis. Monetary economists have understood 
that inflation acts a s  a tax a t  least since Friedman (1968). Greenwood 
and Huffman (1987) find that the inflation tax hypothesis is quantita- 
tively important. They consider the dynamic effects of innovations in 
monetary policy in a calibrated cash-in-advance model and find that a 
positive innovation in the growth rate of money increases nominal 
interest rates, increases prices and lowers employment. In their 
model, inflation is a tax on labor income that induces households to 
work less and thus lowers output. This inflation tax effect is present 
in most transaction demand models of money in which there is a 
labor supply decision. 
The second hypothesis is the liquidity effect hypothesis. While this 
hypothesis is the maintained hypothesis underlying most central 
bank actions, it is only recently that theories have been developed 
that produce liquidity effects in flexible price general equilibrium 
models. Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1991) were some of the first 
researchers to develop models that are consistent with this 
hypothesis. These models limit the ability of certain sectors to interact 
or react to a n  innovation in money supply. Christiano(l991) 
subsequently found that calibrated versions of these models often had 
the property that the inflation tax effect was larger than the liquidity 
effect. Even though a liquidity effect was present, the equilibrium 
responses in most cases were consistent with the inflation tax 
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hypothesis. In addition, even when the responses were consistent 
with the liquidity effect hypothesis, they were not persistent and 
disappeared in the next period after households and firms readjusted 
their portfolios. Wically, adjustment costs of one form or another are 
needed to generate persistent liquidity effects (see also Christiano and 
Gust ( 1999)). 
The final hypothesis is reflects the properties of a costly price 
adjustment model a s  in Rotemberg (1996). Rotemberg (1996) posits a 
model in which monopolistically competitive firms incur costs when 
they adjust their prices. A demand for money is introduced using a 
cash-in-advance constraint. His model successfully reproduces some 
of the principal empirical features of the data but has the property 
that a surprise increase in the growth rate of money supply raises 
nominal interest rates, output and prices. The reason for this is that 
a t  the time of the arrival of the shock, expectations of higher future 
inflation act to raise the nominal interest rate. However, prices do not 
fully respond to the innovation and thus current consumption is 
temporarily a bargain. Christiano. Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) find 
that this property of the costly price adjustment model is robust to 
many natural extensions. They do succeed in producing a specifi- 
cation in which the nominal interest rate falls, but find that i t  implies 
a labor supply elasticity that is implausibly large and that harms the 
model's performance in other dimensions. 
An assumption made in most of the analyses described above is 
that the growth rat.e of money supply is exogenous and persistent. 
This assumption is not innocuous and relaxing it could conceivably 
increase the number of candidates beyond the three alternatives that 
we consider here. Unfortunately, our understanding of how these 
properties of the models vary with the specification of the monetary 
policy feedback rule is still in its infancy (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
and Evans (2005) and Braun and Waki (2005) for recent examples of 
papers that relax this assumption in respectively the U.S. and Japan). 
Results in Aiyagari and Braun (1998) suggest that the sign responses 
of monetary transactions demand models may be reasonably robust 
to the exact details of the feedback rule. They compare and contrast 
simple exogenous money supply rules with optimal monetary policies 
in a liquidity effecl model and costly price adjustment model along 
the lines of Rotemberg (1996). In both models there is a role for an  
activist monetary policy. It turns out that the qualitative properties of 
the responses. which form the basis of our hypotheses, are the same 
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under both the exogenous and optimal monetary policies. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that most of the empirical work 
described above is calibrated to U.S. data. We will assume below that 
these hypotheses are empirically relevant for Korea and Japan, too. 
111. The Statistical Model 
In this section we describe the reduced form VAR's, the choice of 
variables and the simulation methodology used to evaluate the 
alternative hypotheses. 
A. The Reduced Form VAR 
We start from assuming the following VAR model for the macro 
structure: 
where xt is a (Kx  1) vector of macroeconomic variables, L is a lag 
operator, and C(L) = C + C2L+ ... + c ~ L ~ -  ' . In order to identify the 
innovation to monetary policy we orthogonalize the variance- 
covariance matrix of ul. That is we find a P such that 
The details of how P is chosen are described below. Using the 
transformations %=Pxt and E ~ = P ~ ~  we can rewrite (2) as: 
B. Variable Selection 
The choice of variables for the VAR is motivated by two criteria. 
First, we want a list of variables that collectively summarizes the 
principal links between monetary policy and the economy. In 
particular, we want to include the most important variables 
considered by the monetary authority when conducting monetary 
policy. Second, we also want the list to include those variables that 
are known to be consistent with the liquidity effect hypothesis. That 
is we want to bias things in favor of the conventional explanation 
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about how monetary policy affects economic activity.3 These consider- 
ations led u s  to consider two distinct lists of monthly variables for the 
U.S. and two lists of monthly variables for Korea and Japan. Our 
baseline VAR model for the U.S. consists of the six variables: xtUS= 
(CPIt, Yt. NBRI, Rt,TOTRt,PCOMl)' where CPI is the price level a s  
measured by the Consumer Price Index, Y is output a s  measured by 
Industrial Production, NBR is non-borrowed reserves, R is the federal 
funds rate, and PCOM is a commodity price index. 
We use a different baseline set of variables for Korea and ~ a ~ a n .  
First, we omit non-borrowed reserves. There is no evidence that the 
Bank of Korea or the Bank of Japan has monitored non-borrowed 
reserves and in fact neither agency releases data on non-borrowed 
reserves. In addition, efforts to construct non-borrowed reserves from 
existing data in Japan have the peculiar property that they are 
negative for substantial sub-periods of our sample.4 Our 11st of 
variables for Japan and Korea consists of xtP= (CPI,, Y,, TOTR!, Rt. Mot, 
FXt)' where. R is the call rate,s MO is the monetary base, and FX is 
the Yen/$ spot exchange rate. The Yen/$ exchange rate is included 
because it is an  important information variable for the central banks 
in both Korea and Japan. In order to facilitate comparison between 
Korea, Japan, and the U.S. and to check the robustness of our 
conclusions for the U.S., we also report results for the U.S. using the 
CPI, industrial production, total reserves, the monetary base and a 
commodity price index. In the robustness analysis below we consider 
a much larger set of variables. 
C. Identflcation of Structural Shocks 
Our strategy for identifying structural shocks combines zero 
restrictions on the contemporaneous response of variables to 
structural shocks with sign restrictions on the impulse response 
functions. 
Below we wlil report evidence agalnst the liquidity effect hypothesis. By 
chooslng variables that are known to be consistent wlth thls hypothesis we 
are giving thls hypothesls its best possible chance. This makes our evidence 
against this hypothesis more compelling. 
See ShioJi (2000) for more details. 
we use the monthly average of the overnight rate on uncollateralized 
loans. 
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a) Zero Restrictions 
We impose a block recursive structure that nests the recursive 
identification scheme advocated by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Evans (1998) a s  a special case. We partition the vector of variables 
into three blocks. For the U.S. baseline case, the first block consists 
of the price level and industrial production, the second bock includes 
non-borrowed reserves and the federal funds rate. The third block 
includes total reserves and the commodity price index. To set notation 
suppose that P- ' is block triangular: 
AU the sub-blocks of P-' are dimensioned (2 x 2). Observe next that 
C =P-'P-" implies that C will have the same number and shape of 
partitions a s  P- '. 
The block recursive structure is reflected by the fact that the 
partitions above the diagonal are all matrices of zeros. This structure 
imposes restrictions on the contemporaneous responses of variables 
in sector j to shocks in sector i. Under these assumptions all 
variables in the second and third blocks respond contemporaneously 
to shocks in the price level and industrial production.6 Shocks to 
non-borrowed reserves and the federal funds rate will only have 
contemporaneous affects on variables in blocks two and three. Total 
reserves and the commodity price index have no contemporaneous 
affect on variables in the other two sectors. 
Under these assumptions the task of identifying the five structural 
shocks comes down to determining the sub-matrix p2j1. Our recursive 
restriction on the first block is sufficient to pin down PG' and PZ. 
Given a particular choice of P2;', PG' is determined uniquely from C. 
The block recursive structure does impose some restrictions on P;'. 
The elements of P;' must be chosen so that: 
'Formally we can identify monetary policy without imposing any other 
restrictions on the (1.1) block of P. However, identification of monetary 
policy also depends on the other auxiliary assumptions relating to the block 
triangular structure of P. In Braun and Shioji(2003) we attempt to 
completely identify all of the shocks. 
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1) shocks to non-borrowed reserves and the federal funds rate 
are orthogonal. 
and 
2) ~ii '~i i"=Czz - C 2 1  C T ~  ~ 2 1 ' ~  Q 
We will show below that these restrictions only identify P$ u p  to a 
scalar. 
b) Sign Restrictions 
The system described above js not completely identified. In order to 
complete the identification of monetary policy, we impose sign 
restrictions on the impulse response functions. Our methodology for 
doing this is a rejection based quasi-bayesian monte-carlo procedure 
that builds on previous work by Canova(2002). Faust (1998), and 
Uhlig (200 1 ). 
Before going into the details, it is helpful to the reader to provide 
an  overview of how this procedure works. We start with a set of sign 
restrictions on the impulse response functions that embody one of 
our three hypotheses regarding the effects of monetary policy shocks 
on economic activity. The exact form of the restrictions and their 
motivation are described in section IV below. We then randomly draw 
from the posterior distributions of the matrix of reduced form VAR 
coefficients, the variance covariance matrix of the error term. C, and 
the free elements of PZ to find a set of coefficients that satisfy the 
sign restrictions. If a particular monte-carlo draw satisfies the sign 
restrictions we tabulate it, otherwise it is discarded. 
Let 60, ~ ( L I ,  and 2 denote the estimated values of the coefficients 
and variance covariance matrix of the estimated reduced form VAR. 
Under a diffuse normal prior the estimated coefficients' posterior will 
also be normally distributed and the variance covariance matrix will 
be Wishart distributed (see Uhlig(2001) for more details). The first 
step is to take a draw from the posterior distribution of coefficients 
and variance covariance matrix of the VAR. Denote the i th random 
draw by leo.1, &L), 2,). A draw from the posterior distribution of the 
variance covariance matrix gives us a random realization for the 
sub-matrix 2 2 2 . 1  and a realization of iI given in (4). Next, we calculate 
the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of 2 2 2 . 1  and 61 and perform a 
second monte-carlo simulation over the free elements in Pi;. 
Take 2 ~ 2 . 1  and denote the eigenvalues of this (2x2)  matrix as P I  
and PZ, and the corresponding eigenvectors a s  vl and vz. Uhlig (20011 
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TABLE 1 
RESPONSE OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES TO A CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY 
POLICY SHOCK UNDER THE THREE ALTERNATNE HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis F'rices Output Money I n Z p t  
Inflation Tax Hypothesis Up  Down Up  UP 
Liquidity Effect Hypothesis Down Down Down Up 
Costly Price Adjustment Hypothesis Down Down Down Down 
Note: Note that we are defining a contractionary monetary policy here to be 
one that produces a fall in output. 
shows that the first column of pi;, which we denote by a, has to take 
the following form: 
where the a's are weights attached to each of the two eigenvalues. 
We impose the following normalization: 
This leaves us with one degree of freedom to determine the weights. 
We draw al's randomly from a uniform distribution, and then choose 
ais to satisfy condition (6). An a chosen in this way pins down the 
first column of P T ~ .  The second column is calculated using the 
restriction PC~PT~ '=  Czz - ~ 2 1 ~ 7 1  & I , =  Q . At this point we have a 
completely specified data generating mechanism and can calculate 
impulse response functions and ascertain whether or not they satisfy 
our sign restrictions. 
We turn now to describe how sign restrictions on the impulse 
response functions are imposed and used to discriminate among the 
three hypotheses. 
D. Imposing the Three Hypotheses on the Data 
Table 1 summarizes the sign restrictions that the three hypotheses 
imply for the responses of prices, output, narrow money, and the 
interest rate following a contractionary monetary policy shock. 
Observe that the three hypotheses impose distinct restrictions on the 
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impulse response functions. 
In order to complete the specification of the sign restrictions it is 
necessary to specify the horizon over which these restrictions are 
binding. Friedman (1968) suggested that the liquidity effect might be 
operativc a t  horizons of up to a year. We choose to only restrict the 
responses in the first five to six months after the arrival of the shock 
and do so in a rather weak way. Let month 0 denote the month in 
which the shock to monetary policy arrives. month 1 denote the first 
month after the arrival of the shock and, etc. For output and prices 
we will assume that the sign restriction for a particular hypothesis is 
satisfied if the impulse response function for the respective variable 
has  the correct sign in a majority of months 1 through 7. For money 
and the interest rate we will assume that the hypothesis is satisfied if 
the impulse response function for the respective variable has  the 
correct sign in a majority of steps 0 through 6 .  This distinction 
between prices and output, on the one hand, and money and interest 
rates, on the other hand, arises because the block recursive structure 
implies that the response of output and prices in month 0 is zero. 
In choosing this particular set of sign restrictions we tried to strike 
a balance between two issues. First, in existing monetary models 
most variables respond quickly to innovations in monetary policy and 
responses peak within one or two months of the arrival of the shock. 
While these models may be lacking in propagation, they reflect our 
best understanding of how the economy works and we think these 
restrictions should be taken seriously and imposed on the data. On 
the other hand, the empirical VAR literature on identifying monetary 
policy shocks often finds that it can take up to two years for some 
variables, such a s  prices, to show a statistically significant response. 
To accommodate these findings, we chose t.o make the restrictions 
relatively weak and only require that a majority of the signs be correct 
in the first 6 months after the arrival of the shock. 
Finally, it is iniportant to note that these sign restrictions are joint 
restrictions on thc coefficients of the VAR, the variance covariance 
matrix of the disturbances and the a's. A valid data-generating 
mechanism consists of a draw from the posterior distribution of the 
estimated coefficients, a draw from the posterior distribution of the 
variance covariance matrix, C, and a particular vector of a's that 
satisfy all of the sign restrictions for a particular hypothesis. 
The frequency of valid draws for a partlcular hypothesis provides 
information of the plausibility of a particular hypothesis. We will 
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focus primarily on two measures of plausibility. First, we will perform 
simulations in which we condition on the estimated coefficients of a 
reduced form VAR and just randomize over choices of the a's. If the 
number of successful draws from a large number of trails is very rare 
we will take this as evidence against that particular maintained 
hypothesis. 
Second, we perform simulations where we make outer-loop draws 
from the posterior of the estimated coefficients of the VAR as 
described above, then for each draw from this posterior we take 
multiple inner-loop draws of the a's. We then tabulate the frequency 
of trials for which a draw from the outer-loop yields at least one 
inner-loop draw that is consistent with a particular maintained 
hypothesis. 
The frequencies tabulated in this way are used to calculate 
posterior odds ratios for the three hypotheses. To see how this is 
done, let S, denote the i th structure where, IS,, i= 1,2;..,I]. A struc- 
ture consists of complete specification of a data generating mecha- 
nism including the list of variables, the number of lags and the 
maintained hypothesis about how monetary policy affects the 
economy. We calculate the posterior probabilities of each structure 
given the data X using Bayes formula: 
where c is a normalizing constant that insures that the probabil- 
ities sum to one, p(SI) is the prior probability of each structure, and 
p(XISr) is the probability of the data given S , .  
N. Results 
A. U.S. Data 
Table 2 reports results for each of the three maintained hypotheses 
for two specifications the baseline specification with prices, output. 
non-borrowed reserves, the Federal funds rate and a commodity price 
index and an alternative specification where the Yen-Dollar exchange 
rate is used in place of the commodity price index. All results are 
based on a sample period running from 1981:l through 1999:12. The 
total number of draws in each case was 50,000. Results are reported 
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for VARs with alternatively 12, 6, and 3 lags. 
Consider first the results listed under the heading of Commodity 
Prtce. It is standard practice in the structural VAR literature to search 
for an orthogonalization of the variance-covariance matrix of shocks 
that produces results which correspond to the liquidity effect 
hypothesis while conditioning on the estimated coefficients of the 
VAR. The results reported in the column headed frequency of good 
draws report results correspond to this same type of exercise. These 
simulations condition on the estimated coefficients for the reduced 
form VAR and then search for orthogonalizations of the variance 
covariance matrix of shocks that satisfy the restrictions of a 
particular hypothesis by randomizing over the a's. The frequency of 
goods draws reported in this column the fraction of 5000 random 
draws from the a's that satisfies the restrictions for a particular 
hypothesis. It is worth emphasizing that all of the results reported in 
this column produce the same likelihood function value. If the 
frequency good draws is zero a s  occurs in e.g, the case of the costly 
price adjustment specification with 12 lags this means that zero 
draws out of 5000 satisfied the restrictions of a particular hypothesis. 
If  one takes a classical perspective to hypothesis testing, this is 
evidence of a rejection of that hypothesis. In this case, one would 
have to use a different configuration of the estimated coefficients of 
the VAR that is different from those given by the reduced form 
unrestricted VAR to find any successful draws and the resulting value 
of the likelihood function would be lower. This is because the 
unrestricted VAR estimates are MLE estimates. Since each maintained 
hypothesis has the same number of sign restrictions this constitutes 
a rejection of that specification. 
Consider now the commodity price results for 12 lags reported in 
Table 2 under the heading frequency of good draws. According to the 
zero draw criterion the costly price adjustment model is rejected. The 
inflation tax hypothesis has a somewhat higher frequency of good 
draws than the liquidity tax hypothesis. We do not interpret this fact 
though a s  to say anything further about the relative plausibility of the 
two hypotheses. A frequency that is positive indicates that a t  least 
one orthogonalization achieves the maximum unrestricted likelihood 
function value. A finding that the frequency of orthogonalizations is 
large for a particular hypothesis says something about robustness but 
does not say anything aboul. the plausibility of that hypothesis either 
from a classical or Bayesian perspective. 
TABLE 2 
U.S. DATA 
Specification: Commodity Price Exchange Rate 
Variables: 
CPI, Industrial Production, Non-borrowed % CPI. Industrial Production. Total Reserves, Reserves. Fed Funds Rate, Total Reserves, Fed Funds Rate, MO, $/Yen Exchange Rate Commodity Prices 
8 3 
Outer-lOO~ Frequency of good Outer- lOO~ Frequency of good 
Hypothesis draws with one or more draws with one or more 
draws** draws** b good inner-loop draws* good inner-loop draws* 0 








Inflation Tax 3 
12 lags 0.722 0.104 0.336 0.395 
6 lags 0.554 0.000 0.938 0.338 
3 lags 0.208 0.000 0.854 0.123 
Notes: * 500 outer-loop draws from posterior of VAR and 100 inner-loop draws to decompose variance. 
** Conditional on estimated VAR coefficients. 5000 random draws to decompose variance. 
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Next, we allow for sampling uncertainty in the estimated values of 
the reduced form VAR by drawing from the posterior distribution of 
the reduced form VAR.7 Consider first the results for the specifi- 
cations with 12 lags. This is the number of lags used in e.g. 
Christiar.0, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998). If one starts from a 
uniform prior over the three alternative hypotheses then using 
equatlon (5) with weights of 113 for each hypothesis and plugging in 
the frequencies from column two of Table 2 for each hypothesis. the 
posterior probabilities for the costly price adjustment hypothesis. the 
liquidity effect hypothesis and the inflation tax hypothesis are respec- 
tively (0.27.0.29,0.44). These results imply that t.he posterior odds for 
the inflation tax hypothesis is about 2 relative to either of the other 
two hypotheses and that the costly price adjustment hypothesis and 
liquidity effect hypothesis have posterior odds ratios of about 1. Once 
we allow for parameter uncertainty there is no sense in which the 
liquidity effect hypothesis is more empirically relevant than the other 
two hypotheses. 
Given the strong priors that the profession has in favor of the 
liquidity effect hypothesis, it is interesting to ask how this empirical 
evidence might affect the beliefs of a Bayesian decision maker whose 
prior is heavily weighted in favor of the liquidity effect hypothesis. 
Suppose one starts with prior beliefs of (0.1, 0.8, 0.1) over respec- 
tively the costly price adjustment hypothesis, the liquidity effect 
hypothesis, and the inflation tax hypothesis, then these results imply 
posterior probabilities of (0.088. 0.77. 0.147). An individual with 
strong priors would continue to be very confident in the liquidity 
effect hypothesis after viewing the evidence for the VARs with 12 lags 
presented in column 1. 
The impulse response functions and one standard error confidence 
intervals for the baseline results with 12 lags are reported in column 
1 can be found in Figure 1. The impulse responses are averages 
across good draws with 500 outer-loop replications and 100 inner- 
loop replications. Confidence intervals are based on standard errors 
for good draws. Looking first. a t  thc results for the liquidity effect 
hypothesis in the first column we see that the results are broadly 
7~lthough discussed above, it is worth repeating that the posterior we 
are drawing values of VAR coefflcients from does not reflect the imposition 
of any restrlctlons from a maintained hypothesis. These restrictlons get 
imposed by throwing out bad draws. 
Response of VAR variables to Response of VAR variables to 
shock to monetary policy: shock to monetary policy: 
Liquidity effect maintained hypothesis Costly price adjustment hypothesis 
500 outer-loop draws, 100 inner-loop draws 500 outer-loop draws. 100 inner-loop draws 
baseline variables baseline variables 
Response of VAR variables to 
shock to monetary policy: 
Inflation tax maintained hypothesis 
500 outer-loop draws, 100 inner-loop draws 
baseline variables % 0 
X 
-00011 
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FIGURE 1
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consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature (see e.g. 
Christiano. Eichenbaum. and Evans (1998) for a survey). The price 
response is small in early periods and then declines thereafter. 
Non-borrowed reserves fall sharply In early periods but damp quickly. 
By period 6, the response of non-borrowed reserves is insignificantly 
different from zero. The response of the Federal funds rate is also 
strongest in early periods but transient. The response of total reserves 
is persistently negative. And commodity prices cycle down, up  and 
down. The response of output though is different from the previous 
literature. Even though we restrict the output response to be negative 
in a majority of the first 5 periods, output rises in the first two 
periods following the shock. 
The results for the costly price adjustment hypothesis and the 
inflation tax hypothesis with 12 lags are reported respectively in 
columns two and three. Notice that the results for these two 
hypotheses are quite similar with the exception of output. Output 
falls in early periods for the costly price adjustment hypothesis and 
rises in all periods for the inflation tax hypothesis. The similarity of 
the responses for the two hypotheses is broadly consistent with what 
theory would predict. As prices adjust under the costly price 
adjustment hypothesis, one would expect that the inflation tax effect 
would dominate and that the responses a t  medium horizons would be 
very similar under the two hypotheses. 
Finally, note that there is a substantial difference in the output 
response between the liquidity effect hypothesis, on the one hand. 
and the costly price adjustment and inflation tax hypotheses on the 
other hand. Under the liquidity effect hypothesis the response of 
output is about zero from month 10 and on. Under the other two 
hypotheses the response of output is larger and more persistent. This 
finding is also confirmed by variance decompositions. Under the 
liquidity effect hypothesis monetary policy explains less than 3.5% of 
the variance in output a t  all horizons of 24 months or less. Under the 
inflation tax hypothesis, on the other hand, monetary policy explalns 
11% of the variance in output at  the 12 month horizon and 15% of 
the variance in output at  the 24 month horizon. 
a) Robustness 
Much of the previous VAR literature has assumed up front that the 
liquidity effect hypothesis is correct. The results presented so  far 
show some evidence against this tiypothesis irsing monthly U S ,  data. 
MONETARY POLICY AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 129 
If one assigns equal prior probabilities to each hypothesis the 
inflation tax model receives most posterior weight. Still, a skeptic who 
is reasonably firm in the belief that the liquidity effect hypothesis is 
correct would assign most weight to the liquidity effect hypothesis 
after being presented with empirical evidence on the other two 
hypotheses. However, the analysis, so far. has used the same 
variables and the same number of lags as the previous literature. We 
now turn to investigate whether the conclusions are robust to 
variations in the number of lags and the variables that appear in the 
vm. 
Consider first the results for lag lengths of 3 and 6 reported in 
Table 2 under the Commodity Price heading. Our previous conclusions 
about the liquidity effect hypothesis are robust to the choice of lag 
length. We fail to reject this hypothesis using the classical criterion. 
Shorter lags alter the performance of the other two models though. 
There are now rejections of the inflation tax hypothesis. We now fail 
to reject the costly price adjustment hypothesis. For both the three 
lag and six lag specifications the costly price adjustment hypothesis 
now has the highest frequency of outer-loop draws with one or more 
good inner-loop draws. For the three lag specification if we start with 
a diffuse prior, the posterior odds are (0.536. 0.344, 0.120) and for a 
skeptical prior of (0.1, 0.8, 0.1). the posterior odds are (0.158, 0.808, 
0.035). A skeptic would still assign posterior odds of about 5 to 1 in 
favor of the liquidity effect hypothesis over the costly price adjustment 
hypothesis after viewing this evidence. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 under the heading Exchange Rate 
provide evidence on how the results vary with the particular choice of 
variables. These results u s e  the consumer price index, industrial 
production, total reserves, MO and the $/Yen exchange rate in the 
Vm. The most striking feature of these results is that our previous 
conclusions about the liquidity effect hypothesis are now overturned. 
For this set of variables the liquidity effect hypothesis is rejected on 
the basis of the frequency of good draws for all choices of lag lengths. 
The costly price adjustment model is also rejected when the number 
of lags is 6. Now, if one starts with a skeptical prior of (0.1, 0.8, 0.1) 
the posterior distribution over the three hypotheses with 6 lags is: 
(0.144, 0.302, 0.553 ) with the inflation tax hypothesis now receiving 
most posterior weight. 
The fact that the conclusions that one draws by looking at the two 
panels in Table 2 are so different raises two questions. The first 
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question is; whether there is something special about the choice of 
variables used in the second panel? Our rationale for this choice of 
variables is that they make sense for Japan and Korea and are also 
available for all three countries. However, it is possible that this is a 
bad chciice of variables. To investigate this possibility we experi- 
mented with alternative choices of variables and also changed the 
restrictions. Starting from the choice of variables in the right panel we 
tried using the commodity price index in place of the exchange rate 
and rejected the liquidity effect hypothesis a t  all lag lengths. We then 
tried putting the commodity price index in the first block of equations 
and ordered it third. The liquidity effect hypothesis was once again 
rejected for all lags. We then tried using M1 in place of MO and again 
rejected the liquidity effect hypothesis at  all lag lengths. 
The second question is: what is responsible for these rejections? It 
is well known that the price puzzle can sometimes arise even if 
commodity prices are included in the VAR in U.S. data so we also 
tried changing the identifying restrictions and required instead that 
the response of prices be negative in a majority of periods 6 through 
11. We continued to reject the liquidity effect hypothesis in all of the 
experiments we performed above. We next tried a series of runs 
placing non-borrowed reserves in place of total reserves and we 
continued to reject this hypothesis. We also repeated the above 
experiments by considering variants of the variables in the left panel. 
We reject the liquidity hypothesis if we replace the commodity price 
index with the foreign exchange rate. We also reject the liquidity 
hypothesis if we replace total reserves with a broader measure of 
money e.g. MO or M1. Finally, we tried removing the constraint on 
prices and continued to reject the liquidity effect hypothesis. It is 
worth emphasizing that these variations are all informative in that at 
least one of the other two specifications always fails to be rejected. 
Further investigations revealed that the source of the rejections is 
due to the response of output. We noted above that the average 
response of output reported in Figure 1 is positive for the liquidity 
effect hypothesis for the first several periods even though on a draw 
by draw basis the response is constrained to be negative for a 
majority of periods 2 through 7. This suggests that the challenge 
under the maintained liquidity effect hypothesis may be producing 
sensible output responses. To explore this possibility we took the 
exchange rate specification and reduced the number of periods that 
the sign constraint on output binds to 3 months out of the first 6 and 
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then to 2 months out of the first 6. Under this final restriction the 
liquidity effect hypothesis is no longer rejected. We found similar 
results for the other specifications. 
These results suggest that a particular choice of variables is very 
important for producing empirical specifications that are consistent 
with the liquidity effect hypothesis. If one deviates from this list of 
variables, the liquidity effect hypothesis is rejected in U.S. data. The 
source of this rejection is not a price puzzle but instead the response 
of output. This output response is not a challenge for the other two 
theories and this is why they are not rejected. 
B. Results for Japan 
For Japan we consider two specifications: A VAR that includes the 
CPI less food, industrial production, total reserves, the call rate. MO 
and a commodity price index and a second specification that includes 
the Yen/$ exchange rate instead of the commodity price index. The 
sample period starts in 198 1 : 1 and ends in 1996: 12. We chose to end 
the sample period here because there were several unusual events 
that occurred in 1998-1999. In 1998 markets for overnight interest 
rates were disrupted due to concerns about default by Japanese 
banks. The Bank of Japan's zero interest rate policy caused further 
disruptions in 1999. Results for Japan using 3, 6, and 12 lags in the 
VAR are reported in Table 3. 
Consider first the results for the specifications with commodity 
prices. When we condition on the estimated coefficients of the 
unrestricted VAR we find zero good draws for the liquidity effect 
maintained hypothesis for the 3, 6, and 12 lag specifications. 
According to this criterion the inflation tax specification with 12 lags 
is also rejected. When one allows for parameter uncertainty a skeptic 
with priors over the costly price adjustment hypothesis, liquidity 
effect hypothesis and inflation tax hypothesis of (0.1, 0.8, 0.1) assigns 
posterior probabilities of (0.33, 0.56, 0.11) to the three hypotheses. 
For the 3 lag specification there are no successful draws when one 
draws 500 times from the posterior distribution of VAR coefficients.8 
The other noteworthy feature of the results is that the performance of 
the inflation tax model improves as the number of the lags is 
'We increased the outerloop draws to 5000 in order to get some good 
draws and found that the frequency of success was still zero to two digits 
under the liquidity effect maintained hypothesis. 
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reduced. Overall. though the costly price adjustment model is best. 
The results for the specification with the exchange rate reported in 
Table 3 are qualitatively similar. The liquidity effect hypothesis is 
rejected if one applies a classical test that conditions on the data. 
However, if one allows for parameter uncertainty the posterior odds 
for a skeptic still favor the liquidity effect hypothesis when the 
number of lags is 12 or 6. 
We report impulse responses for the 12 lag specifications with 
exchange rates in Figure 2. A comparison of the second and third 
columns in Figure 3 reveals an important difference between the 
costly price adjustment and inflation tax hypothesis results. The 
output responses under the two hypotheses are quite different. Under 
the costly price adjustment hypothesis the response of output is 
negative for 20 months before turning positive. Under the inflation tax 
hypothesis, in contrast, the response is positive in all months except 
month 2. 
There are also some differences in the response of exchange rates 
across the three hypotheses. Under the liquidity effect hypothesis the 
response of the exchange rate is generally negative indicating nominal 
appreciation of the Yen while under the other two hypotheses the Yen 
appreciates in the impact period and then depreciates in all 
subsequent periods. Overall, the results shown here are consistent 
with the perspective that policy induced increases in interest rates 
lead to appreciation of the home currency. 
a) Robustness 
The results reported in Table 3 depend crucially on the sign 
restriction on prices. If this restriction is not imposed two things 
happen; a large and persistent price puzzle arises and the liquidity 
effect hypothesis is no longer rejected. One question that we explored 
was; could an alternative price variable or ordering resolve the price 
puzzle for Japan? We tried several alternative measures of prices 
including oil prices, a wholesale price index and also tried ordering 
the price variable third in the first block. We continued to get zero 
successful draws for the liquidity effect hypothesis for all specifica- 
tions but one. If oil prices are included in a VAR with 3 lags and are 
ordered third then we get one successful draw out of 5000 
replications when conditioning on the coefficients of the estimated 
VAR. 
McCallum (1994) has argued that the spread on long and short 
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rates is an important information variable for the monetary authority 
so we also re-estimated the three models using CPI less food, 
industrial production, MO, the call rate rate, the yield on 10 year 
offshore swaps9 and the Yen/Dollar exchange rate. For a specifi- 
cation with 12 lags the posterior distribution associated with our 
skeptical prior was (0.04. 0.80. 0.6). We also extended the sample to 
1999:12 and found that including this additional data had no  
substantial effect on the results. Finally, we also tried runs using the 
1 month Tibor rate instead of the call rate and found that this also 
had no substantive effect on our results. 
Braun and Shioji (2005) report results using a different sample 
period and additional yield curve variables. Simulations reported 
there also reject the liquidity effect hypothesis using the frequency of 
good draws criterion. 
Taken together these results provide considerable evidence in  
Japanese data against the liquidity effect hypothesis and indicate 
further that Japanese data is most consistent with the costly price 
adjustment hypothesis. 
C. Korean Data 
Next we turn to consider results from Korea which are reported in 
Table 4. We consider the same two specifications that we used for 
Japan. The first uses monthly data on the CPI less food, industrial 
production. total reserves, the call rate, monetary base and a 
commodity price index. The second specification uses the Won-Dollar 
exchange rate in place of the commodity price index. The primary 
source of the data is the Bank of Korea homepage. In cases, where 
the complete time-series were not available e.g.  Won-Dollar exchange 
rate, we used data from International Financial Statistics from the 
IMF. The sample period for Korea is chosen based on two 
considerations. First, the deregulation of financial markets and move 
towards using open market operations to implement monetary 
objectives is relatively recent to Korea. Deregulation of financial 
markets started in the early 1990s and continued throughout the 
1990s. We start our sample in 1991. An earlier start date would 
mean including periods when interest rates were regulated and a later 
start date makes the sample too short to make any meaningful 
'Open market purchases and sales of long-term bonds are large in 
Japan-about 70% of monetary base in Japan is backed by long-term bonds. 
KOREAN DATA 
Specification: Commodity Price Exchange Rate Unrestricted Exchange Rate Restricted 
CPI. Industrial Production. 
Variables: Total Reserves. Call Rate Rate. 
MO. Commodity Price 
Frequency of 
outer-loop draws Frequency Sample 
H - ~ t h e s i s  Period with one or more of good 
good inner-loop draws*' 
draws* 
Costly Price Adjustment 
CPI. Industrial Production. 
Total Reserves, Call Rate Rate. 
MO. Won/$ Exchange Rate 
Frequency of 
outer-loop draws Frequency 
with one or more of good 
good inner-loop draws*" 
draws* 
CPI. Industrial Production, 
Total Reserves. Call Rate Rate. 
MO. Won/$ Exchange Rate 
Frequency of 
outer-loop draws Frequency 
with one or more of good 
good inner-loop draws** 
draws* 
6 lags 96:l-04:5 0.238 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.174 0.000 
3 lags 96:l-04:5 0.138 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.092 0.000 2 
3 lags 96: 1-96:3 0.732 0.132 0.852 0.387 0.834 0.387 :: 
Liquidity Effect 0 
6 lags 96: 1-04:5 0.678 0.193 0.598 0.180 0.042 0.000 s 
3 lags 96:l-04:5 0.742 0.164 0.782 0.381 0.090 0.000 5 
3 lags 96: 1-96:3 0.994 0.605 0.998 0.383 0.318 0.000 2 
Inflation Tax 
6 lags 96: 1-045 0.824 0.464 0.882 0.524 0.404 0.052 
3 lags 96:l-04:5 0.858 0.481 0.858 0.476 0.298 0.035 
3 lags 96:l-96:3 0.004 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Notes: 500 outer-loop draws from posterior of VAR and 100 inner-loop draws to decompose variance. 
" Conditional on estimated VAR coefficients. 5000 random draws to decompose variance. 
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inferences. The second consideration in choosing our sample period is 
the Asian crisis. This is a big economic event for Korea and whether 
one includes this period has important implications for the inferences 
that we draw. For these reasons, results will be reported for a sample 
that runs until May 2004 and thus includes the crisis period and also 
a shorter sub-sample that ends in March 1996. 
Finally, the shortness of the sample period and a concern about the 
small number of degrees of freedom led us to restrict attention to 
VARs with alternatively 3 and 6 lags for the longer sample period and 
to 3 lags for the shorter sample period. 
Consider first the results using the commodity price index reported 
in the left panel of Table 4. For the long sample period there is 
considerable evidence against the costly price adjustment hypothesis. 
When we condition on the estimated coefficients of the VAR and 
perform classical inference we reject the costly price adjustment 
specification for the whole sample period. This is not particularly 
surprising given that the Asian crisis was accompanied by sharply 
higher interest rates, higher prices and low levels of economic activity. 
These same events favor the inflation tax specification. We also fail to 
reject the liquidity effect hypothesis for the whole sample period. 
Posterior odds ratios for the whole sample assign somewhat more 
weight to the inflation tax specification but the liquidity effect 
hypothesis also receives significant posterior weight. With a diffuse 
prior of 1 /3  for each hypothesis the posterior probabilities for the 
costly price adjustment hypothesis, liquidity effect hypothesis and 
inflation tax hypothesis are respectively (0.08,0.43,.49) for the 3 lag 
specification. 
If attention is limited to the pre-crisis sub-sample the inflation tax 
specification is rejected. The frequency of good draws under this 
hypothesis is zero. Moreover, the frequency of outer-loop draws with 
one or more good inner-loop draw is also very small. Under a uniform 
prior the posterior probabilities are (0.580. 0.418, 0.002). It is clear 
from this that the Asian crisis is largely responsible for the success of 
the inflation tax hypothesis in the longer sample period. 
Using the other set of variables yields similar results. Results 
reported under the heading Exchange Rate Unrestricted show rejections 
of the costly price adjustment hypothesis for the longer sample period 
and rejections of the inflation tax hypothesis for the shorter sample 
period. The liquidity effect hypothesis is not rejected for either sample 
period. 
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Figure 3 reports impulse responses for the three hypotheses for the 
whole sample period using VARs with 3 lags and the exchange rate 
specification. These figures show some other evidence that favors the 
liquidity effect hypothesis. For the costly price adjustment specifi- 
cation the responses of the call rate and the CPI are both non- 
monotonic. These two variables switch signs a s  soon a s  the sign 
restrictions cease to bind. These figures in conjunction with the 
rejections found in Table 3 suggest there is a lot of information in the 
Asian crisis and that this information is strongly a t  odds with the 
costly price adjustment hypothesis. Based on the responses reported 
in Figure 3, it is much easier to reconcile the facts from the Asian 
crisis with the other two hypotheses. 
Another noteworthy feature of Figure 3 is that all three hypotheses 
are inconsistent with the view that policy induced increases in the 
call rate lead to a nominal appreciation of the home currency. One 
possibility is that the Asian crisis is producing large movements in 
the exchange rate during this period that are mistakenly being 
attributed to monetary policy. The Asian crisis was a period where the 
call rate in Korea rose at  the same time that the Won depreciated. If 
this is the case though one would expect that this puzzle would 
disappear in the shorter sample period. To explore this possibility 
consider Figure 4 which reports impulse responses for the pre-crisis 
period. The number of lags in the VARs is three. Interestingly, the 
costly price adjustment hypothesis now shows a response of the 
exchange rate that is consistent with uncovered interest rate parity. 
However, the liquidity effect hypothesis continues to produce 
anomalous exchange rate responses. 
An advantage of our approach is that one can easily see how the 
answers change a s  one imposes more restrictions on the hypotheses. 
The right panel of Table 3 labeled exchange rate restricted imposes 
the previous restrictions plus the additional restriction that the 
Korean nominal exchange rate appreciate when monetary policy 
increases the call rate. Imposing this restriction does not affect either 
the costly price adjustment hypothesis or the inflation tax hypothesis 
but it does affect the results for the liquidity effect hypothesis. This 
hypothesis is now rejected on the basis of the frequency of good 
draws criterion for all lag/samplc configurations. lmposing this 
additional restriction also affects the outcomes for the Bayesian test. 
Now the costly price adjustment specification performs best for the 
shorter sub-sample. Figure 5 shows how the responses for the whole 
Response of VAR variables to Response of VAR variables to Response of VAR variables to 
shock to monetary policy: shock to monetary policy: shock to monetary policy: 
Liquid~ty effect maintained hypothesis Costly price adjustment hypothesis Inflation tax maintained hypothesis 
500 outer-loop draws, 100 inner-loop draws 500 outer-loop draws, 100 inner-loop draws 500 outer-loop draws, 100 inner-loop draws 
baseline variables baseline variables baseline variables 
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sample period are affected by imposing this further restriction. 
The responses are generally similar to the previous results with the 
exception that the sign of the exchange rate now accords well with 
theory for the liquidity effect hypothesis. The costly price adjustment 
hypothesis still produces average impulse responses for the exchange 
rate that are inconsistent with uncovered interest rate parity even 
though the signs have been restricted for each individual draw. 
Moreover, the responses of the CPI and the call rate are once again 
non-monotonic under this hypothesis. 
Although we reject the liquidity effect hypothesis on the basis of 
zero good draws in other respects this hypothesis lines up well with 
the facts. The impulse responses reported in Figure 5 look reasonable 
and are similar to the responses reported in Figures 3 and 4. 
Moreover, the posterior odds ratio under a diffuse prior for the costly 
price specification and the liquidity effect specification is about 1 
using data from the 3rd panel of Table 4. 
As a final check on the robustness of our conclusions for Korea we 
also considered 3 lag VARs with the CPI, industrial production, total 
reserves, the call rate. MO and the exchange rate in the post-Asian 
crisis period. The starting date is 1999:l and the terminal date is 
2004:5. The results for this sub-sample reinforce our previous 
conclusions that Korea data favors the liquidity effect hypothesis. If 
we condition on the estimated values of the VAR both the costly price 
adjustment hypothesis and the inflation tax hypothesis are rejected 
using the classical hypothesis test. However, we accept the liquidity 
effect hypothesis. We also accept the liquidity effect hypothesis when 
the additional signconstraint is imposed on the exchange rate 
response. 
Overall. Korean data provides the most consistent evidence in favor 
of the liquidity effect hypothesis among the three countries we have 
considered. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
A cornerstone of central bank policy in most countries is that an 
expansionary monetary policy is associated with the liquidity effect 
hypothesis. Results presented here suggest that t.his premise should 
be viewed with caution. Using monthly U.S. data we have found that 
if one deviates even slightly from specifications that previous research 
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has found to support the liquidity effect hypothesis, that this 
hypothesis is rejected. The source of this rejection is not a price 
puzzle but instead the output response. We find it interesting that the 
distinction between the response of output is not a puzzle for the 
costly price adjustment hypothesis. Indeed, the impulse responses 
under this maintained hypothesis are in good accord with the 
predictions of theory. 
We also find that the liquidity effect hypothesis is rejected for all 
specifications except one using monthly Japanese data. In Japan the 
rejection of the liquidity effect hypothesis is due to the response of 
prices. If the price response is not constrained, a large and persistent 
price puzzle arises. Posterior odds ratios generally favor the costly 
price adjustment hypothesis in Japan and in some cases are so large 
as to even convince a skeptic who assigns most prior probability to 
the liquidity effect hypothesis. 
Korean data provides the most evidence in favor of the liquidity 
effect hypothesis. This hypothesis performs well in the period before 
the Asian crisis and also sample periods that include the crisis. The 
only puzzle for this hypothesis is the response of exchange rates. 
Unrestricted impulse responses have the property that an  increase in 
the Korean call rate induces a nominal depreciation of the Won. This 
occurs both in sample periods that include the crisis and periods that 
pre-date it. If exchange rates are also restricted. this hypothesis is 
rejected using a classical test. However, posterior odds ratios and 
other properties of the impulse responses support this hypothesis. 
It's worth noting that our results are not of necessarily a t  odds with 
the liquidity effects in high frequency Japanese data on bank 
reserves.10 Hayashi (2000). for instance, has  found empirical evidence 
of liquidity effects a t  the end of reserve maintenance periods. If 
periodic unexpected shocks to bank's reserves occur towards the end 
of the maintenance period, this can induce a precautionary demand 
for liquidity. However, these effects disappear a t  the start of the next 
maintenance period because banks reserve requirements are based on 
average balances over the entire maintenance period and they thus 
have great flexibility in adjusting their reserve balances early in the 
maintenance period. Embedding these types institutional details of 
''Note that this use of the term liquidity effect is more narrowly defined 
as an increase in the supply of reserves that drives the overnight rate 
down. 
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the Japanese market for reserves in a general equilibrium hypothesis 
that  can link these types of liquidity effects to movements in larger 
monetary aggregates or other macro variables is an interesting topic 
for future research. 
More generally we view the empirical methodology we have 
described here to be an  attractive way to incorporate restrictions from 
theory. If one is confident in a particular hypothesis our approach 
provides a way to impose this hypothesis on the data and assess it 
against other hypotheses. In addition. our approach provides a way to 
produce results that are robust to aspects of the empirical speciflca- 
tion that we don't have much a priori information about such as the 
orthogonalization, the number of lags, and the specific choice of 
variables. 
(Received 12 September 2005: Reuised 1 November 2005) 
References 
Aiyagari, Rao. and Braun. R. Anton. "Some Models to Guide 
Monetary Policyrnakers." Carnegie Rochester Conferences 
Series on Public Policy 48 (1998): 1-42. 
Basu, S.. and Kimball, Miles. Investment Planning Costs and the 
Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy. Unpublished Manu- 
script, 2003. 
Bernanke. Ben, and Mihov, Ilian. "Measuring Monetary Policy." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 13 (No. 3 1998): 869-902. 
Braun, R. Anton. and Waki. Yuichiro. Monetary Policy during 
Japan's Lost Decade. Forthcoming in Japanese Econornlc 
Reuiew, 2005. 
Braun, R. Anton, and Shioji, Etsuro. Aggregate Risk in Japanese 
Equity Markets. CIRJE Discussion Paper 2003-CF-250. 2003. 
. Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of Interest 
Rates in Japan. Forthcoming in Journal of Money, Credit and  
Banking, 2005. 
Canova, Fabio, and Nicolo. C. Di. "Monetary Disturbances Matter 
for Business Fluctuations in the C-7." Journal of Monetary 
Economics 49 (No. 6 2002): 1 13 1-59. 
Christiano, Lawrence. "Modeling the Liquidity Effect. of a Money 
Shock." Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly 
MONETARY POLICY AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 145 
Review 15 (No. 1 1991): 3-34. 
Christiano, Lawrence. Eichenbaum, Martin, and Evans, Charles. 
"The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks. Some Evidence from 
the Flow of Funds." Review of Economics and Statistics 78 
(NO. 1 1996): 16-34. 
. "Sticky Price and Limited Participation Models of Money: 
A Comparison." European Economic Review 41 (No. 6 1997): 
1201 -49. 
. Monetary Policy Shocks: What Have We Learned and to 
What End? NBER Working Paper 6400, 1998. 
. Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock 
to Monetary Policy. Forthcoming in Journal of Political 
Economy, 2005. 
Christiano, Lawrence J., and Gust, Christopher J. ''Taylor Rules in 
a Limited Participation Model." De Economist 147 (No. 4 
1999): 437-60. 
Cooley, T. F., and Hansen, G. D. 'The Inflation Tax in a Real 
Business Cycle Model." American Economic Review 79 (No. 4 
1989): 733-48. 
Faust, Jon. "The Robustness of Identified VAR Conclusions about 
Money." Carnegie Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 
49 (1998): 207-44. 
Fuerst. Timothy S. "Liquidity, Loanable Funds, and Real Activity." 
1991, In Finn Kydland (ed.), Business Cycle Theory. pp. 
251-72, 1995. 
. "Liquidity, Loanable Funds, and Real Activity." Journal 
of Monetary Economics 29 (No. 1 1992): 3-24. 
Friedman, Milton. 'The Role of Monetary Policy." American Economic 
Review 58 (March 1968): 1-17. 
Greenwood, Jeremy, and Huffman, Gregory W. "A Dynamic 
Equilibrium Model of Inflation and Unemployment." Journal 
of Monetary Economics 19 (No. 2 1987): 203-28. 
Hayashi, Fumio. "Identifying a Liquidity Effect in the Japanese 
Interbank Market." International Economic Review 42 (May 
2001): 287-315. 
Ireland, Peter N. "A Small, Structural, Quarterly Model for Monetary 
Policy Evaluation." Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy 47 (1997): 83-108. 
Leeper. Eric, Sims, Christopher, and Zha, Tao. "What Does 
Monetary Policy Do?" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
146 S E O U L  J O U R N A L  O F  ECONOMICS 
(NO. 2 1996): 1-63. 
Lucas, Robert E.. J r .  "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money." 
Journal of Economic Theory 4 (April 1972): 103-24. 
. "Liquidity and Interest Rates." Journal of Economic 
Theory 50 (April 1990): 237-64. 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr.. and Stokey. Nancy L. "Money and lnterest in 
a Cash-in-Advance Economy." Econometrics 55 (May 1987): 
491-513. 
McCallum, B. T. "A Reconsideration of the Uncovered Interest Parity 
Relationship." Journal of Monetay Economics 33 (No. 1 
1994): 105-32. 
Rotemberg, Julio J .  "Prices. Output, and Hours: An Empirical 
Analysis Based on a Sticky Price Model." Jo~trnal of Monetary 
Economics 37 (No. 3 1996): 505-33. 
Sargent, Thomas J. Dynamic Macroeconomic Tlleoy. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. 
Shioji, Etsuro. "Identifying Monetary Policy Shocks in Japan." 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 14 (No. 
1 2000): 22-44. 
Uhlig, Harald. What are the Effects of Monetary Policy on Output? 
Results from an Agnostic IdentificaUon Procedure. Unpub- 
lished Manuscript, 200 1. 
. What are the Effects of Monetary Policy on Output?: 
Results from an Agnostic Identification Procedure. Forthcom- 
ing in Journal of Monetay Economics, 2004. 
